VW, Again, Said To Need Urgent Survival Reform; Don’t Hold Your Breath
Volkswagen is in crisis again, as critics say it should behave like a normal shareholder-owned company. Despite the huge problems, don’t expect radical action.
Neil Winton, Senior Contributor
Forbes
3 min read
7/10
Wolfsburg
Key Takeaways
Volkswagen’s operating margin fell to 4.7% in Q1 2026, compared to BMW’s 8.1% and Stellantis’s 7.3%, according to company filings.
Institutional investors representing over 15% of VW’s free float have publicly called for governance reform, including unwinding the veto power of Lower Saxony.
VW’s China sales dropped 12% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, as BYD and Nio captured nearly 50% of the domestic EV market.
The Trinity EV plant in Wolfsburg has been delayed from 2026 to 2029, with cost overruns exceeding €1 billion, sources close to the project say.
Since Blume became CEO in 2022, VW’s stock has underperformed the DAX by 22%, and its market cap has fallen to €65 billion from €85 billion in 2021.
Volkswagen is facing yet another existential crisis, with critics demanding it finally behave like a normal shareholder-owned company. But entrenched governance and political interests mean radical reform remains unlikely. The world’s second-largest automaker has been here before — the dieselgate scandal, failed EV pivots, and now a brutal competitive landscape. This time, the pressure is coming from investors tired of seeing VW’s market value lag behind Tesla and BYD. Chief among the critics is a growing faction of institutional shareholders who argue that Volkswagen’s unique ownership structure — where the state of Lower Saxony holds a blocking minority and the Porsche-Piëch family controls a majority of voting rights — shields management from accountability. Without the threat of a takeover or activist board, they say, executives have little incentive to cut costs, streamline operations, or accelerate the EV transition. The result: Volkswagen’s operating margin has slipped below 5%, well behind rivals like Stellantis and BMW, while its Chinese joint ventures lose ground to local EV champions like BYD and Nio. The company’s flagship ID. series has struggled with software glitches and range anxiety, and its planned €2 billion Trinity factory in Wolfsburg faces delays. Analysts at Bernstein and UBS have cut their price targets, warning that VW’s cost base is too high for the volume it sells. Meanwhile, European Union emission fines loom, and the shift to electric is not happening fast enough to meet 2025 targets. The key names here are CEO Oliver Blume, who took over in 2022 but has yet to deliver a clear turnaround plan, and works council head Daniela Cavallo, who has resisted factory closures. The real power lies with the Porsche-Piëch family, now represented by Hans Dieter Pötsch, and Lower Saxony’s prime minister, Stephan Weil, both of whom prioritize jobs over profits. For them, VW is not just a company — it’s a pillar of regional identity and a political bargaining chip. The broader implication: Volkswagen’s crisis is a case study in how legacy automakers struggle to adapt when governance is captive to stakeholders who fear change more than they fear failure. As Chinese and US competitors race ahead, VW risks becoming the Nokia of the automotive world — a once-dominant giant that couldn’t reinvent itself in time. What happens next will depend on whether the upcoming supervisory board meeting in July produces any concrete reform proposals. Watch for signs of a capital restructuring, a potential carve-out of the struggling software unit Cariad, or a hint that the family might dilute its voting stake. Without such moves, the refrain will remain: don’t hold your breath.
Frequently Asked Questions
Volkswagen faces declining margins, stiff competition from Chinese EV makers, and a governance structure that resists change. Critics say the company’s dual-board system and state ownership shield management from accountability, slowing the needed transformation.
Institutional investors and analysts are calling for Volkswagen to behave like a normal publicly traded company. They want to end Lower Saxony’s veto power, streamline the brand portfolio, cut labour costs, and accelerate the EV rollout by spinning off unprofitable units like Cariad.
Volkswagen has a unique ownership structure: the Porsche-Piëch family controls a majority of voting rights, while the state of Lower Saxony holds a 20% stake with a blocking minority. The remaining shares are publicly traded but carry limited voting power.
Because the state and the family prioritize job security and regional stability over shareholder returns, there is little external pressure to cut costs or divest underperforming assets. This governance inertia prevents the radical action needed to compete with more agile rivals.
Volkswagen plans to launch a new generation of electric models on its SSP platform by 2028, but delays and software issues have plagued the rollout. The ID. series has struggled to gain market share against Tesla and Chinese competitors, and the Trinity factory in Wolfsburg is behind schedule.